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a b s t r a c t
Population behavior is a key factor in the evolution and outcome of insurgencies. This behavior is affected
by the violence exerted by the insurgents and the regime. In this paperwemodel the effect of targeted (i.e.,
coercion) andmisguided (i.e., collateral casualties) violence on the behavior of the population. It is shown
that excess violence and poor targeting accuracy may lead to situations where a population’s support for
a certain side will vanish.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Popular behavior is a key factor in the evolution and outcome
of an insurgency [1,5,6,9]. An insurgency is an asymmetrical com-
bat situation where a relatively small, ill equipped and poorly
trained grass-root force, typically motivated by ideology, religion
and social grievances, challenges the regime, which is backed by a
sizable, trained and well equipped military force. The civilian pop-
ulation, caught in between these two adversaries, is an important
third player; each one of the two sides – the insurgents and the
regime – needs the population’s support. For the insurgency, the
population is a source of recruitment, physical support, and infor-
mation. For the regime, the population is a source of valuable in-
formation, which is utilized for better targeting the low-signature
insurgents, who are diffused in the population. Each side carries
out violent actions to attain its objectives. The regime uses vio-
lence to fight the insurgents and put pressure on their identified
collaborators,while the insurgents attack the regime forces and co-
erce people to deter them from supporting the regime. Civilians get
hurt, directly or indirectly (e.g., injury or death of a family member
or a friend), by these violent actions. The exposure to violence af-
fects the people’s sense of security and is a major factor in shaping
their allegiance to one side or another [7,12]. Two recent studies
in the political science literature examine the impact of violence
on popular behavior in Iraq [3] and Afghanistan [2]. Both studies
find that civilian causalities caused by coalition forces increase fu-
ture insurgent violence and civilian causalities caused by insur-
gents decrease future insurgent violence. These results illustrate
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the importance of popular support, and how that support changes
based on civilian casualties. Notwithstanding the cultural and ide-
ological background of individuals, and their response to social and
economic incentives offered by each side, people will support the
side that is perceived as providing better security for the popula-
tion at large. Thus, violence is a double edge sword for both the
insurgents and the regime. On the one hand violence is needed to
fight the other side and perhaps deter individuals in the popula-
tion from supporting the other side, but on the other hand it can
turn the population against the source of that violence. The prob-
lem is amplified when a certain side has poor targeting accuracy
that results inmany unintended casualties among the civilian pop-
ulation. Before proceeding, we note that a recent study using data
from Chechnya [11] found that indiscriminate violence from gov-
ernment forces can reduce insurgent violence. The author admits
however that this finding is opposed to much of the research in
the area (e.g., [3,2]) and believes such a relationship is the excep-
tion, rather than the rule. The paper focuses on indiscriminate vi-
olence against civilians, which may be appropriate for describing
the current situation in Syria (Spring 2012), but not the situation
studied in this paper. Therefore, we will assume the relationship
found in [3,2] where civilian causalities have a negative impact for
the side responsible for the violence.
We develop in this note a dynamic, differential equations,
model that captures key aspects of the relations among violence,
targeting accuracy and population behavior. Specifically, we con-
sider four key parameters: the violence intensity ratio between the
insurgents and the regime, the effectiveness of coercion, the target-
ing accuracy of the violence and the sensitivity of the population to
that violence, as manifested in the way they ‘‘remember’’ violent
events that affected them directly or indirectly. The main conclu-
sions of the analysis are: (1) Excess violence and poor targeting ac-
curacy may lead to situations where the population’s support for
0167-6377/$ – see front matter. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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a certain side will vanish; (2) The regime should not be discour-
aged by an initial small level of popular support because there are
situations where this would actually play to its advantage; (3) The
effect of the initial distribution of opinions in the population on the
outcome of the insurgency depends on the population’s response
pattern to violence. For some response patterns the outcome is in-
sensitive to this initial distribution.
2. Setting and assumptions
In insurgency situations violence is generated by the regime
and the insurgents. The regime carries out targeted violent
actions against the insurgents, but absent perfect situational
awareness regarding the location and identity of the insurgents,
and employing imprecise weapons, the regime’s forces may
inadvertently hit civilians. We assume that the regime does not
intentionally coerce the population, and, as stated before, it does
not use indiscriminate violence against the civilian population
(e.g., as happened in Chechnya [11]). Civilian casualties from the
regime’s violence only occur as a result of collateral damage. The
insurgents attack the regime’s forces but also exert coercive actions
against individuals suspected to be collaborating with the regime,
attempting to deter these suspected collaborators from doing so.
While the insurgents can clearly identify themilitary targets when
fighting the regime, they cannot do that while coercing potential
supporters of the regime. The insurgents’ knowledge regarding
the identities of these supporters is limited, which may result in
erroneously coercing the wrong people—some of whom may be
their own supporters.
We assume a very simple binary response pattern to violence;
the result of experiencing violence generated by one side
(insurgents or regime) is becoming an opponent to that side.
This is consistent with the findings in [3,2]. The question is
what is the endurance of that effect – how long this violent
experience will shape an individual’s behavior – and what would
happen if that individual is suddenly hit by the other side? What
happens if the individual is hit multiple times by both sides?
How will this individual change his allegiance? These type of
questions, which involve emotion andmemory, have been studied
in the behavioral psychology literature [16]. Much work has
been done examining how people react to multiple events or
items. Examples include advertising [14] (i.e., which commercials
people remember most strongly) and political campaigns [13]
(i.e., what timing and content of campaign messages resonate
most with potential voters). We could not find any studies that
analyze how individuals react, process, and remember multiple
traumatic or violent events. Because memories of traumatic and
non-traumatic events are processed differently [15], we did not
want to extrapolate the results from the study of non-traumatic
memory to our civilian casualty context. Instead, our model can
handle multiple types of memory paradigms. We assume that
without an experience of violence, an individual is sensitive and
thus will turn against the side that first hits him. Because of the
traumatic effect, an individual becomes insensitive immediately
after experiencing violence, where new violent events do not
change his behavior for a while. Eventually the effect fades away
and an individual may transition back to the sensitive state where
a new experience of violence by the other side may change his
allegiance. This behavioral pattern is consistent with the results
in [3] that found that a side was ‘‘punished’’ immediately after
causing collateral casualties, but then, after a few weeks, the
disadvantage faced by the responsible side disappeared. While
we model the general case where individuals transit from an
insensitive stage back to a sensitive stage, we only analyze the
two extreme cases, sometimes called in the literature of behavioral
psychology Primacy and Recency (see e.g., [10,13]). Primacy means
that the first experience to some stimulus shapes the behavior of an
individual and therefore the transition is always oneway: sensitive
(to the stimulus) to insensitive. On the other extreme, Recency
postulates that the last experience is the dominant one, that is, an
individual always remains sensitive to the stimulus (violence).
The population is divided into three parts: (1) active supporters
of the regime, called henceforth Actives and denoted as A,
(2) neutrals or latent supporters of the regime, called henceforth
Latents and denoted as L, and (3) opposition to the regime
(supporters of the insurgents), called henceforth Contrarians and
denoted as C . We do not explicitly model neutrals who support (or
hate) both the regime and insurgents. Actives provide intelligence
and aid to the regime to help them defeat the insurgents. While
Latents prefer the regime to the insurgents, they do not help
the regime out of fear of reprisals from the insurgents. From an
operational standpoint (e.g., intelligence gathering), the regime
only benefits from the Actives in the population. Latents can
switch to Actives, and vice-versa, depending upon the violence
generated by the regime and insurgents. Since we assume that
the regime does not intentionally coerce civilians with violence,
we do not distinguish between active and latent Contrarians and
assume that all Contrarians are active. The misguided violence
is detrimental to the side exerting it; collateral casualties by
the regime’s actions may generate Contrarians, and collateral
casualties by insurgents’ actions may become active supporters of
the regime. Active supporters of the regime who are successfully
coerced by the insurgents become latent. At any given time,
the population is divided into individuals who are sensitive to
violent actions – they change their behavior according to the
source of violence they experience (directly or indirectly) – and
individualswho are insensitive. Insensitive individuals do not react
to violence. A sensitive individual, who experiences violence and
changes his behavior, becomes insensitive for a while. Insensitive
individuals become sensitive again at a certain constant rate. As is
discussed in the next section, this insensitive–sensitive transition
rate determines the effect of the violent actions. If this rate is zero,
then the population only comprises first-event individuals who
determine their behavior according to the first event of violence
they experience and do not change their behavior thereafter. This
scenario represents the Primacy effect discussed above. If this
transition rate is very high (infinity), then the population only
comprises last-event (memoryless) individuals who change their
behavior based on the last act of violence they experience. This
scenario represents the Recency effect. In reality, it is most likely
that the population behavior lies in-between these two extremes.
The accuracy of the targeting of actions carried out by both sides
– the regime and the insurgents – is represented by the fraction
of violent actions that are correctly targeted (see [9]). The rest
of the violence is ‘‘shooting in the dark’’—violence that is spread
over the population in the region contested by the two forces
in a spatially uniform manner. The targeting accuracy depends
on the information available to each side and we focus on two
extreme cases: perfect targeting accuracy and none (‘‘shooting in
the dark’’). Finally, we assume that the rate of change in population
behavior as a result of insurgents and regime actions is higher than
the rate at which the violence intensities of the two sides change
due to mutual attrition and other operational and environmental
factors. Thus, the violence rate, on both sides, is assumed to remain
constant throughout.
Based on these assumptions, we develop in the next section a
model that captures the dynamics of popular behavior as a result of
insurgents’ and regime’s violence. Before,we proceed to themodel,
we note the asymmetry between the regime and insurgents in our
framework. The violence generated by the regime is only directed
at the insurgents. While some of that violence may fall mistakenly
on the population and produce collateral damage, the regime
Author's personal copy
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does not target civilians directly with violence (e.g., coercion).
The violence generated by the insurgents is only the coercion
directed at civilians to deter them from supporting the regime (i.e.,
Actives). From the insurgents’ perspective, increasing violencemay
be an effective tool tomanipulate the population by decreasing the
fraction of Actives. However, the regime never benefits in terms
of population behavior by increasing its violence level because
this only serves to potentially alienate their supporters and drive
them to become Contrarians. The conclusion is not that the regime
should avoid generating any violence. The objective of the regime is
not to maximize popular support; it is to defeat the insurgents and
they need to generate violence in order to accomplish this. Thus the
level of violence generated by the regime is a constant exogenous
to the model that reflects the strategic situation and the tactics of
the regime’s forces.We discuss this issue further in the Conclusion.
3. Notation and model
Let AH ≥ 0, LH ≥ 0 and CH ≥ 0, denote the fraction of Actives,
Latents and Contrarians, respectively, who are insensitive to vio-
lent actions. We use the superscripts S and H to denote sensitive
and insensitive (‘‘hardened’’) individuals, respectively. We define
AS ≥ 0, LS ≥ 0 and CS ≥ 0, as the fraction of Actives, Latents
and Contrarians, respectively, who are sensitive to violent action
and therefore will change their behavior when experiencing vio-
lence. We have, AH + LH + CH + AS + LS + CS = 1. Insensitive
individuals are those who recently have been affected by violence
and thus have a firm attitude towards the regime and the insur-
gents, according to the source of the violence that affected them.
Over time, the memory of the violence may fade out, the attitude
may become less firm, and people will become sensitive again to
violence, that is, they may change their attitude according to the
new source of the violence that affects them. We assume that in-
sensitive individuals become sensitive again at a rate ρ. Let λR and
λI denote the rate of violent actions by the regime and the insur-
gents, respectively. Recall that according to our assumption, the
values of λR and λI remain constant throughout. The parameters
representing targeting accuracy are denoted by vR and vI for the
regime and the insurgents, respectively; v = 1 means perfect tar-
geting accuracy while v = 0 implies none. Finally, let ϵ denote the
fraction of sensitive Activeswho are successfully coerced by the in-
surgents and therefore become Latents. This parameter reflects the
‘‘compliance’’ rate—the effect of the insurgents’ coercive actions on
the intended target population of Actives. The set of equations that
represents this situation is:







+ λI(1− vI)(LS + CS)− ρAH (1)
















L˙S = − (λI(1− vI)+ λR(1− vR)) LS + ρLH (4)
C˙H = λR(1− vR)(LS + AS + CS)− ρCH (5)
C˙S = −[λI(1− vI)+ λR(1− vR)]CS + ρCH (6)
where A = AS + AH .
The last term on the right hand side of each one of the
Eqs. (1)–(6) represents transitions from insensitive individuals to
sensitive ones. The right hand side of (1) has three terms. The
first term represents sensitive Actives who are not deterred by
the insurgents’ coercion and remain Actives. Note that this term
comprises direct targeted coercion, λIvI , and indirect dispersed
coercion λI(1 − vI)AS (see [9]). The direct targeted coercion falls
correctly on the Actives, as intended, due to accurate information
(i.e., intelligence) the insurgents may have on the identities of
Actives in the population. The direct targeted coercion is scaled
by the fraction of sensitive individuals among the Actives ( A
S
A ),
reflecting the fact that the insurgents cannot distinguish between
sensitive and insensitive Actives. The indirect dispersed coercion
represents ‘‘coercing in the dark’’ that happens to fall on the
Actives by chance. The second term represents sensitive Latents
and Contrarians, who experience (unintended) violence by the
insurgents and become Actives. The first term on the right
hand side of (2) represents sensitive Actives who are affected
by the regime violence and therefore become Contrarians. The
second term represents sensitive Actives that are coerced by the
insurgents and either become insensitive Actives (with probability
1 − ϵ) or Latents (with probability ϵ). The interpretations of
the right hand side of the rest of the equations are similar.
Note in (6) that sensitive Contrarians are affected by two types
of unintended violence: mistargeted coercion by the insurgents
and collateral effects of regime counterinsurgency activities. The
former results in insensitive Actives while the latter results in
insensitive Contrarians. Asmentioned above, these individualswill
become sensitive again at a rate ρ.
Next we consider two extreme cases: ρ = 0 and ρ = ∞.
The first case represents Primacy behavior; an individual’s attitude
is determined by the first act of violence he experiences and
therefore once he becomes insensitive to violence, he remains
like this forever. On the other extreme (ρ = ∞) we have the
Recency behavior; an individual changes his attitude according to
the last violence event he experiences. We assume for simplicity
that initially the entire population is sensitive. This assumption
is not necessary, but the general case, where initially a fraction
of the population is sensitive while the other fraction is not, is
notationally cumbersome and does not provide any additional
insights. Let A0, L0 and C0 denote the initial distribution of the
population to Actives, Latents and Contrarians, respectively. We
denote by A∗, L∗ and C∗ the end-state fractions of Actives, Latents
and Contrarians, respectively. Finally, let α = λI
λR
denote the
violence intensity ratio between the insurgents and the regime.
4. Primacy behavior
In this case the first experience of violence is dominant.
Therefore ρ = 0, and the last term on the right hand side of
each one of Eqs. (1)–(6) vanishes. We consider four extreme cases
regarding the accuracy functions, corresponding to perfect and no
accuracy. Proofs of the results are given in the Appendix.
Case P1: vR = vI = 1.
In this case both the regime and the insurgents have perfect
targeting accuracy. The violence is targeted correctly and therefore
there are no collateral casualties. It follows that C∗ = C0, L∗ =
L0 + ϵA0, A∗ = (1− ϵ)A0. Note that in this case the end states are
independent of the violence intensity ratio (α).
Case P2: vR = vI = 0.
In this case both sides are ‘‘shooting in the dark’’, generating
collateral casualties as they fight and, in the case of the insurgents,
coerce. The end-states in this case are: C∗ = 11+α , L∗ =
αϵ
1+αA0, A
∗ = α1+α (1 − ϵA0), which are independent of the
initial ratio between Contrarians and Latents. The regime should
minimize its violence as much as operationally possible and
encourage violence by the insurgents, so that it is the insurgents
who cause the collateral casualties.
Case P3: vR = 1; vI = 0.
This is the best case for the regimewhere it has perfect targeting
accuracy, while its opponent – the insurgency – has none. The
violence is targeted correctly by the regime and therefore there
Author's personal copy
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are no collateral casualties generated by the regime, only by the
insurgents. Here obviously C∗ = 0 and L∗ = ϵA0, A∗ = 1−ϵA0. As
in case P1, the end-states are independent of the violence intensity
ratio, and as in case P2, they are independent of the initial ratio
between Contrarians and Latents. It is interesting to note that the
regime is better off with a small initial body of support (small A0)
than a large one. This also occurs in case P2. The reason for this
surprising observation is a combination of the lack of targeting
accuracy by the insurgents and the Primacy effect; initial Actives
are sensitive and therefore susceptible to coercion, while Actives
generated from the insurgents’ collateral casualties are insensitive
and therefore will never be successfully coerced.
Case P4: vR = 0; vI = 1.
This is the worst-case scenario for the regime. In this case the
insurgents have perfect targeting accuracy while the regime has
none. Mathematically, this is also the most complicated case. The







α(1 − ϵ) −
αϵ, L∗ = ϵ1−ϵ A∗, C∗ = 1 − A∗ − L∗, where W (·) is the Lambert
W function (see e.g., [4]). As in cases P2 and P3, the end-states are
independent of the initial ratio between Contrarians and Latents.
The regime is better offwithα large (smallλR) because their violent
acts only serve to alienate the population andpush them to become
Contrarians. However the regime may find it difficult to reduce
λR because it needs a large level of violence to effectively combat
the insurgents. As in case P1, the number of Actives in the end-
state increases with the number of individuals who are initially
Active. If possible, the regime should also take actions to decrease
the effectiveness of coercion (i.e., decrease ϵ).
5. Recency behavior
In this case the last violent event is dominant and therefore the
states XH , X = A, L, C in Eqs. (1)–(6) vanish. The representation of
the dynamics reduces to the following two differential equations.
To simplify notationwedrop the superscript S, which is redundant.
A˙ = −λR(1− vR)A− λIϵ (vI + (1− vI)A)
+ λI(1− vI)(1− A) (7)
C˙ = −λI(1− vI)C + λR(1− vR)(1− C) (8)
with L = 1 − A − C . We derive Eq. (7) by combining Eqs. (1)–(2)
and dropping the terms that transition between AH and AS . The
first term in Eq. (7) represents the Activeswho become Contrarians
because the regime has mistakenly hit them with violence. The
second term is the individuals moving from Active to Latent after
being effectively coerced by the insurgents. As with Eqs. (1)–(2)
this second term contains both direct targeted coercion, λIvI , and
indirect dispersed coercion λI(1 − vI)A. The final term of (7)
represents non-Active individuals who become Actives after the
insurgents mistakenly coerce them. The two terms in Eq. (8) can
be derived in a similar fashion: the first term is the Contrarians
mistakenly coerced by the insurgents and the second term is the
individuals who become Contrarians after being hit by the regime.
The system of equations defined by (7)–(8) has an analytic
solution. The equilibrium point of this system (assuming that vR
and vI are not both 1) is
A∗ = α(1− vI(1+ ϵ))






The regime benefits when coercion has limited effect (i.e., ϵ is
small) and the regime has the targeting advantage (i.e., large vR and
small vI ). By inspection of (9), the regime will receive no active
support if vI > 11+ϵ . If the regime does receive active support,
then it prefers α to be as large as operationally possible because
the fraction of Activeswill increase and the fractions of Contrarians
will decrease. In this case the insurgents have imperfect targeting
accuracy, and thus it is in the regime’s best interest to encourage
the insurgents to instigate violence so they, and not the regime,
are the source of collateral damage. For comparison to the Primacy
situation in Section 4, we next consider four extreme cases.
Case R1: vR = vI = 1.
If both the regime and the insurgents have perfect targeting
accuracy there are no collateral casualties and therefore we are in
a situation similar to Case P1 above. However, since the Actives,
as the rest of the population, remain sensitive, and each coercion
attempt is successful with probability ϵ > 0, eventually all actives
will become latents. Thus, A∗ = 0, C∗ = C0, L∗ = 1 − C0.
The end-states are independent of everything except the initial
fraction of Contrarians. In fact, these end-states are obtained for
more general behavior then pure Recency. That is, for any non-zero
ρ the aforementioned end-states prevail. The reason is that every
insensitive Active becomes, at one point or another sensitive, and
thus susceptible to coercion, while Latents and Contrarians remain
unharmed.
Case R2: vR = vI = 0.
Both sides are essentially ‘‘shooting in the dark’’. The fractions
of Contrarians, Latents and Actives converge to end-states that
depend on the violence intensity ratio α and the coercion
effectiveness ϵ. The end-states do not depend on the initial
fractions of Contrarians, Latents and Actives. Specifically, A∗ =
α
1+(1+ϵ)α , C
∗ = 11+α , L∗ = 1 − (A∗ + C∗). Clearly, the insurgents
and the regime must exercise violence with care; each side would
like the other side to be more of the ‘‘bad guy’’ thus enhancing its
own support. For example, if the intensities of violent actions on
both sides are equal (α = 1), then at equilibrium A∗ = 12+ϵ , C∗ =
1
2 , L
∗ = ϵ2(2+ϵ) , that is, half of the population are Contrarians, and
out of the 50% supporters the fraction of Actives range between 23 ,
if the coercion is perfectly effective, and 1, if it is not effective at all.
When α→ 0 (which means the regime is muchmore violent than
the insurgents: λR ≫ λI ) then A∗ = L∗ = 0, C∗ = 1; the regime,
who exerts much more violence than the insurgents, alienates the
people and therefore the entire population becomes Contrarians.
Conversely, when α → ∞(λR ≪ λI) then A∗ = 11+ϵ ; L∗ =
ϵ
1+ϵ , C
∗ = 0; the insurgents exert such a high level of violence
compared to the regime that, if their violence is accurately targeted
(ϵ = 1) the best they can get is an even split between the Latents
andActives; no Contrarians are left to support them. If the accuracy
is poor (ϵ = 0) everyone becomes Active.
Case R3: vR = 1; vI = 0.
Here the regime has perfect targeting accuracy while the
insurgents have none. This is the best-case scenario for the regime.
The violence is targeted correctly by the regime and therefore
no collateral casualties are generated by the regime, only by the
insurgents. Here C∗ = 0 (obvious), A∗ = 11+ϵ , L∗ = ϵ1+ϵ . Note that
these are the end-states in Case R2 when α→∞.
Case R4: vR = 0; vI = 1.
In this case the insurgents have perfect targeting accuracywhile
the regime has none. This is theworst-case scenario for the regime.
Here A∗ = L∗ = 0, C∗ = 1. Clearly, in this situation in particular
the regime should minimize its violence as much as operationally
possible. Indeed, if λR = 0 then C∗ = C0, L∗ = 1−C0, which is the
best the regime can hope for in this case. Note that if, in addition,
the regime can take actions that render the insurgents’ coercion
ineffective (ϵ = 0) then A∗ = A0, L∗ = L0, C∗ = C0.
6. Discussion and conclusions
In this note we modeled and studied the impact of three key
factors on popular behavior in insurgency situations: the relative
Author's personal copy
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levels of violence intensities of the regime and the insurgents, the
targeting accuracy of each side, andmost importantly, the response
pattern to these acts of violence by the civilian population. We
studied eight cases corresponding to extreme scenarios regarding
the population response to violence and targeting accuracy, and
showed that the popular behavior is crucially dependent on
the assumptions regarding those three key factors. First, if both
sides have perfect targeting accuracy then the initial fraction
of Contrarians remains unaffected. The difference between the
Primacy and Recency cases is that in the former there may remain
some Actives, whose fraction will depend on the effectiveness
of the insurgents coercive actions, while in the latter all the
supporters of the regime will become Latents—there will be no
Actives. Second, if both sides have poor targeting accuracy then
in both cases – Primacy and Recency – the fraction of Contrarians
at the end-state are identical. This common end-state value is
independent of the initial fraction of Contrarians and only depends
on the violence intensity ratio. At violence parity 50% of the
population will end up as Contrarians. The end-state fraction of
Actives depends on its initial fraction in the Primacy case, but is
independent of it in the Recency case. If this initial fraction of
Actives is small enough, the Primacy case is better for the regime
than the Recency one—at the end it will result in a higher fraction
of Actives. Third, in the best-case scenario for the regime, when
it has perfect targeting there will be no Contrarians at the end.
The end-state fraction of Actives is independent of the violence
intensity ratio and it depends on its initial fraction only in the
Primacy case. If the initial fraction of Actives is not greater than
50%, the end-state fraction of activeswill be at least 50%, regardless
of the response behavior of the population. Fourth, in the worst
case for the regime, when it is shooting in dark, the regime wants
to reduce its violence (i.e., decrease λR) as much as is operationally
feasible to avoid alienating all of the Actives. If possible the regime
should also try reducing the impact of coercion on Actives. To
summarize the main insights: if the regime has poor targeting
accuracy (i.e., limited intelligence about the identity and location of
the insurgents and/or imprecise weapons) it must be very careful
when using violence against the insurgents. The regime should
attempt to reach its best-case scenario (perfect accuracy for the
regime and poor for the insurgents) by investing in intelligence
and accurate (vs. lethal) weapons on the one hand, and applying
information operations on the insurgents and enticing them to act,
on the other hand.
While in reality an individual’s reaction to a series of violent
events will be a function of all the events, a reasonable question
is under what situations will the Primacy model be more realistic
than the Recency model and vice-versa? While a full study of this
is more appropriate for the behavioral and cognitive psychology
experts, we can examine the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to
determine if one effect dominates. Condra and coauthors examine
the impact of collateral casualties in Iraq [3] and Afghanistan [2].
Both studies show that a side that generates civilian casualties
is ‘‘penalized’’ by the population. For example, if coalition forces
cause collateral damage, then in the future there will be more
insurgent attacks. However, the manifestation of this penalty is
different in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq there is an immediate
impact, but after several weeks the disadvantage disappears [3].
This suggests Recency may be the dominant factor in Iraq as
the impact of civilian violence is only temporary; presumably
superseded by later violent events. However, in Afghanistan the
impact is not immediate, but results in a long-run disadvantage
for the offending side [2]. This suggests that Primacy may be the
dominant factor in Afghanistan because individuals may exact
retribution for civilian causalities, even if it takes a long time. This is
consistent with the cultural norms of the Pashtuns (the dominant
ethnic group of Taliban) where revenge is a key component
of society, potentially festering for generations [2,8]. If further
studies had confirmed that the Primacy paradigm is a reasonable
representation for the population in Afghanistan, then our analysis
could have provided an insight into counterinsurgency operations
for that conflict. The initial low level of popular support for
coalition forces would not have been a great concern. Because of
the Primacy effect, the impact of collateral damage is severe, so
the coalition forces would benefit from keeping violence levels
as low as possible and baiting the Taliban to lash out against the
population by using information operations.
The most obvious extension of our analysis would be to
examine cases with an intermediate ρ. It appears that the problem
would lose all analytic tractability, but numerical techniques could
examine specific scenarios. Other modifications would have the
regime targeting some of their violent actions on the population
and modeling a neutral population more explicitly who supports
or hates both the regime and insurgents. Perhaps more interesting
than these descriptive models would be a prescriptive model that
analyzes how much violence the regime (or insurgents) should
generate. The regime’s objective is to defeat the insurgents and it
must generate violence and have popular support to accomplish
this. Our model of popular support could be combined with an
insurgency attrition model (e.g., [9]) to analyze this problem.
Optimization techniques such as optimal control theory could then
be utilized to calculate the regime violence profile.
Appendix. Proofs of properties
Lemmas 1–4 apply to the Primacy case.
Lemma 1. If vR = vI = 1, then C∗ = C0 and A∗ = (1− ϵ)A0.
Proof. The right hand side of Eqs. (4)–(6) are 0. Eqs. (1)–(3) become












Thus a fraction (1− ϵ) of the initial Actives (AS) will remain Active
(AH ), implying A∗ = (1− ϵ)A0. 
Lemma 2. If vR = vI = 0, then C∗ = 11+α and A∗ = α1+α (1− ϵA0).
Proof. Eqs. (1)–(6) become
A˙H = (1− ϵ)λIAS + λI(LS + CS) (14)
A˙S = − (λI + λR) AS (15)
L˙H = ϵλIAS (16)
L˙S = − (λI + λR) LS (17)
C˙H = λR(LS + AS + CS) (18)
C˙S = −(λI + λR)CS . (19)
A fraction λR
λR+λI of the initial Latents and Contrarians (L
S + CS)
will transition to insensitive Contrarians (CH ), and the rest will
become Actives (AH ). A fraction λR
λR+λI of the initial Actives (A
S) also
will become Contrarians (CH ). A fraction (1 − ϵ) of the remaining
initial Activeswill remainActive (AH ). Aggregating the components
together produces the result. 
Lemma 3. If vR = 1, vI = 0, then C∗ = 0 and A∗ = 1− ϵA0.
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Proof. Eqs. (1)–(6) become
A˙H = (1− ϵ)λIAS + λI(LS + CS) (20)
A˙S = −λIAS (21)
L˙H = ϵλIAS (22)
L˙S = −λILS (23)
C˙H = 0 (24)
C˙S = −λICS . (25)
All of the individuals who are initially Latents and Contrarians
(LS + CS) will become Active (AH ). A fraction (1 − ϵ) of the initial
Actives (AS) will remain Active (AH ), with the rest switching to
Latent (LH ). Thus only ϵA0 will become Latent, and everyone else
will be Active. 








ϵα and L∗ = ϵ1−ϵ A∗.
Proof. Eqs. (1)–(6) become












L˙S = −λRLS (29)
C˙H = λR(LS + AS + CS) (30)
C˙S = −λRCS . (31)
All of the individualswho are initially Latents and Contrarians (LS+
CS) will transition to insensitive Contrarians (CH ). Thus we only
need to focus on how the initial Actives (AS) will transition to the
three insensitive populations. Dividing Eq. (28) by Eq. (26) yields
dLH
dAH
= ϵ1−ϵ . This produces the desired relationship for L∗. Next






S + AH)− 1
(1− ϵ) . (32)
We can solve Eq. (32) using standard integrating factor techniques
to determine the relationship between AS and AH at any point in
time:
AS = −AH − ϵα + (A0 + ϵα)e−
1
(1−ϵ)α AH . (33)
Substituting AS = 0 into Eq. (33) produces an implicit function for
the end-state fraction of Actives in the population
A0 + ϵα = (A∗ + ϵα)e
1
(1−ϵ)α A∗ . (34)
The solution to Eq. (34) is the Lambert W function expression
specified in the lemma. 
Lemmas 5–7 apply to the Recency case.
Lemma 5. The equilibrium point of the Recency equations described
by (7)–(8) is the pair (A∗, C∗) defined by Eqs. (9)–(10).
Proof. Eqs. (7)–(8) form a decoupled system. Rewriting those two
equations yields a pair of equations easily solved using standard
integrating factor techniques:
A˙ = − (λR(1− vR)+ λI(1− vI)(1+ ϵ))
× A+ λI(1− vI(1+ ϵ)) (35)
C˙ = − (λI(1− vI)+ λR(1− vR)) C + λR(1− vR). (36)
The solutions to these two equations are
A(t) = α(1− vI(1+ ϵ))
1− vR + α(1− vI)(1+ ϵ)
+

A0 − α(1− vI(1+ ϵ))1− vR + α(1− vI)(1+ ϵ)

× e−(λR(1−vR)+λI (1−vI )(1+ϵ))t (37)
C(t) = (1− vR)
α(1− vI)+ (1− vR)
+

C0 − (1− vR)
α(1− vI)+ (1− vR)

× e−(λI (1−vI )+λR(1−vR))t . (38)
As t → ∞ Eqs. (37) and (38) converge to the fixed point values
defined in (9) and (10), respectively. 
Lemma 6. If vR = vI = 1 and ε > 0, then C∗ = C0 and A∗ = 0.
Proof. Eqs. (7)–(8) become
A˙ = −λIϵvI (39)
C˙ = 0 (40)
and since ε > 0, the results follow. 
Lemma 7. The following relationships hold
• If vR = vI = 0, then C∗ = 11+α and A∗ = α1+(1+ϵ)α .
• If vR = 1, vI = 0, then C∗ = 0 and A∗ = 11+ϵ .• If vR = 0, vI = 1, then C∗ = 1 and A∗ = 0.
Proof. These results follow immediately by substituting the
specific values of vR and vI into Eqs. (9) and (10), proved in
Lemma 5. 
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